 | Contents |  |
 |  |  |
 |  |  |
 | Introduction | 1 |
 |  |  |
 | The Object and Approach of This Book | 4 |
 | Limitations | 7 |
 |  |  |
 |  |  |
I. | A Theory of Regulation | 13 |
 |  |  |
1. | Typical Justifications for Regulation | 15 |
 | The Control of Monopoly Power | 15 |
 |
The Traditional Economic Rationale for Regulation. Objections to the Traditional Economic Rationales. Additional Bases for Regulation.
|  |
 | Rent Control or "Excess Profits" | 21 |
 |
What Is a Rent? The Rationale for Regulation.
|  |
 | Compensating for Spillovers (Externalities) | 23 |
 |
What Are Spillovers? The Classical Rationale for Regulation. Objections to the Classical Rationale. A Caveat
|  |
 | Inadequate Information | 26 |
 |
The Classical Rationale for Regulation. Criticisms of the Rationale
|  |
 | Excessive Competition: The Empty Box | 29 |
 |
Historical Use. Current Use
|  |
 | Other Justifications | 32 |
 | The Mixture of Rationales | 34 |
 |  |  |
2. | Cost-of-Service Ratemaking | 36 |
 | The System | 36 |
 | The Problems | 37 |
 |
Determining the Rate Base. Determining the Rate of Return. Efficiency. The "Test Year". Rate Structure
|  |
 |  |  |
3. | Historically Based Price Regulation | 60 |
 | The System | 60 |
 | The Problems | 62 |
 |
Categorization. Cost-of-Service Ratemaking. Allocation. Enforcement. New Investment
|  |
 | Conclusion | 70 |
 |  |  |
4. | Allocation under a Public Interest Standard | 71 |
 | The System | 72 |
 | Problems | 74 |
 |
What Is to Be Allocated? The Selection Process. The Renewal Process
|  |
 | Conclusion | 94 |
 |  |  |
5. | Standard Setting | 96 |
 | The System | 98 |
 |
The Procedural Background. The Standard-Setting Process.
|  |
 | Problems Inherent in the Process | 109 |
 |
Information. Enforcement. Anticompetitive Effects. Judicial Review
|  |
 | Conclusion | 118 |
 |  |  |
6. | Historically Based Allocation | 120 |
 | The System | 120 |
 | The Need for Exceptions | 122 |
 | The Exception Process | 127 |
 | Conclusion | 130 |
 |  |  |
7. | Individualized Screening | 131 |
 | The Food Additive Screening System | 133 |
 | Problems with This Form of Regulation | 135 |
 |
Developing a Test for Risk. The Use of Experts. The Effort to be Comprehensive: Calculating and Weighing Benefits. Varying Standards of Selection
|  |
 | Conclusion | 155 |
 |  |  |
8. | Alternatives to Classical Regulation | 156 |
 | Unregulated Markets Policed by Antitrust | 156 |
 | Disclosure | 161 |
 | Taxes | 164 |
 | The Creation of Marketable Property Rights | 171 |
 | Changes in Liability Rules | 174 |
 | Bargaining | 177 |
 | Nationalization | 181 |
 |  |  |
9. | General Guidelines for Policy Makers | 184 |
 |  |  |
 |  |  |
II. | Appropiate Solutions | 189 |
 |  |  |
10. | Match and Mismatch | 191 |
 |  |  |
11. | Mismatch: Excessive Competition and Airline Regulation | 197 |
 | The Industry | 198 |
 | Regulation | 199 |
 | Harmful Effects of Regulation | 200 |
 | Mismatch as Cause | 209 |
 | Price Regulation. Route Awards. Efficiency. The Effort to Regulate Schedules |  |
 | An Alternative to Classical Regulation | 219 |
 | Conclusion | 220 |
 |  |  |
12. | Mismatch: Excessive Competition and the Trucking Industry | 222 |
 | The Industry and Regulation | 222 |
 | The Effects of Regulation | 227 |
 | Alternatives to Classical Regulation | 234 |
 | Conclusion | 238 |
 |  |  |
13. | Mismatch: Rent Control and Natural Gas Field Prices | 240 |
 | The Industry | 241 |
 | Regulation | 242 |
 | Adverse Effects | 244 |
 | The Mismatch and the Shortage | 247 |
 |
Firm-by-Firm Cost-of-Service Ratemaking. Areawide Cost-of-Service Ratemaking
|  |
 | The Mismatch and Natural Gas Allocation | 253 |
 | Standard Setting. Public Interest Allocation. Negotiation |  |
 | Alternatives | 258 |
 | Conclusion | 260 |
 |  |  |
14. | Partial Mismatch: Spillovers and Environmental Pollution | 261 |
 | The Problems of Standard Setting | 263 |
 | Incentive-Based Systems: Taxes and Marketable Rights | 271 |
 | In Principle. A More Practical Comparison |  |
 | Conclusion | 284 |
 |  |  |
15. | Problems of a Possible Match: Natural monopoly and Telecommunications | 285 |
 | The Characteristics of the Longline Problem | 288 |
 |
The Industry and the Service. Regulation and Joint Costs. The Entry of Competition into Long-Distance Telecommunications
|  |
 | The FCC´s Response to the Problem | 301 |
 |
Above 890. MCI. Specialized Common Carriers (SCCs). AT&T´s Competitive Response: Special Rates. Docket 18128. Expanding the Area of Competition
|  |
 | The Basic Choices | 311 |
 | Conclusion | 314 |
 |  |  |
 |  |  |
III. | Practical Reform | 315 |
 |  |  |
16. | From Candidate to Reform | 317 |
 | The Elements of Implementation | 317 |
 | The Kennedy Hearings | 321 |
 | Preparation. The Actual Hearings |  |
 | Conclusion | 339 |
 |  |  |
17. | Generic Approaches to Regulatory Reform | 341 |
 | Better Personnel | 342 |
 | Procedural Changes | 345 |
 | Fairness and Efficiency. Legitimacy |  |
 | Structural Change | 354 |
 | Managerial Proposals. Supervisory Proposals. New Institutions |  |
 | Encouraging Substantive Reform | 363 |
 | Impact Statements. Encouraging Step-by-Step Reform |  |
 |  |  |
Appendix 1 The Regulatory Agencies | 371 |
 |  |  |
Appendix 2 A Note on Administrative Law | 378 |
 |  |  |
Further Reading | 382 |
 |  |  |
Notes | 386 |
 |  |  |
Index | 462 |