  | Contents |   | 
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  | Introduction | 1 | 
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  | The Object and Approach of This Book | 4 | 
  | Limitations | 7 | 
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| I. | A Theory of Regulation | 13 | 
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| 1. | Typical Justifications for Regulation | 15 | 
  | The Control of Monopoly Power | 15 | 
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The Traditional Economic Rationale for Regulation. Objections to the Traditional Economic Rationales. Additional Bases for Regulation. 
 
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  | Rent Control or "Excess Profits" | 21 | 
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What Is a Rent? The Rationale for Regulation. 
 
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  | Compensating for Spillovers (Externalities) | 23 | 
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What Are Spillovers? The Classical Rationale for Regulation. Objections to the Classical Rationale. A Caveat 
 
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  | Inadequate Information | 26 | 
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The Classical Rationale for Regulation. Criticisms of the Rationale 
 
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  | Excessive Competition: The Empty Box | 29 | 
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Historical Use. Current Use 
 
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  | Other Justifications | 32 | 
  | The Mixture of Rationales | 34 | 
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| 2. | Cost-of-Service Ratemaking | 36 | 
  | The System | 36 | 
  | The Problems | 37 | 
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Determining the Rate Base. Determining the Rate of Return. Efficiency. The "Test Year". Rate Structure 
 
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| 3. | Historically Based Price Regulation | 60 | 
  | The System | 60 | 
  | The Problems | 62 | 
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Categorization. Cost-of-Service Ratemaking. Allocation. Enforcement. New Investment 
 
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  | Conclusion | 70 | 
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| 4. | Allocation under a Public Interest Standard | 71 | 
  | The System | 72 | 
  | Problems | 74 | 
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What Is to Be Allocated? The Selection Process. The Renewal Process 
 
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  | Conclusion | 94 | 
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| 5. | Standard Setting | 96 | 
  | The System | 98 | 
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The Procedural Background. The Standard-Setting Process. 
 
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  | Problems Inherent in the Process | 109 | 
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Information. Enforcement. Anticompetitive Effects. Judicial Review 
 
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  | Conclusion | 118 | 
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| 6. | Historically Based Allocation | 120 | 
  | The System | 120 | 
  | The Need for Exceptions | 122 | 
  | The Exception Process | 127 | 
  | Conclusion | 130 | 
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| 7. | Individualized Screening | 131 | 
  | The Food Additive Screening System | 133 | 
  | Problems with This Form of Regulation | 135 | 
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Developing a Test for Risk. The Use of Experts. The Effort to be Comprehensive: Calculating and Weighing Benefits. Varying Standards of Selection 
 
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  | Conclusion | 155 | 
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| 8. | Alternatives to Classical Regulation | 156 | 
  | Unregulated Markets Policed by Antitrust | 156 | 
  | Disclosure | 161 | 
  | Taxes | 164 | 
  | The Creation of Marketable Property Rights | 171 | 
  | Changes in Liability Rules | 174 | 
  | Bargaining | 177 | 
  | Nationalization | 181 | 
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| 9. | General Guidelines for Policy Makers | 184 | 
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| II. | Appropiate Solutions | 189 | 
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| 10. | Match and Mismatch | 191 | 
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| 11. | Mismatch: Excessive Competition and Airline Regulation | 197 | 
  | The Industry | 198 | 
  | Regulation | 199 | 
  | Harmful Effects of Regulation | 200 | 
  | Mismatch as Cause | 209 | 
  | Price Regulation. Route Awards. Efficiency. The Effort to Regulate Schedules |   | 
  | An Alternative to Classical Regulation | 219 | 
  | Conclusion | 220 | 
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| 12. | Mismatch: Excessive Competition and the Trucking Industry | 222 | 
  | The Industry and Regulation | 222 | 
  | The Effects of Regulation | 227 | 
  | Alternatives to Classical Regulation | 234 | 
  | Conclusion | 238 | 
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| 13. | Mismatch: Rent Control and Natural Gas Field Prices | 240 | 
  | The Industry | 241 | 
  | Regulation | 242 | 
  | Adverse Effects | 244 | 
  | The Mismatch and the Shortage | 247 | 
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Firm-by-Firm Cost-of-Service Ratemaking. Areawide Cost-of-Service Ratemaking 
 
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  | The Mismatch and Natural Gas Allocation | 253 | 
  | Standard Setting. Public Interest Allocation. Negotiation |   | 
  | Alternatives | 258 | 
  | Conclusion | 260 | 
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| 14. | Partial Mismatch: Spillovers and Environmental Pollution | 261 | 
  | The Problems of Standard Setting | 263 | 
  | Incentive-Based Systems: Taxes and Marketable Rights | 271 | 
  | In Principle. A More Practical Comparison |   | 
  | Conclusion | 284 | 
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| 15. | Problems of a Possible Match: Natural monopoly and Telecommunications | 285 | 
  | The Characteristics of the Longline Problem | 288 | 
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The Industry and the Service. Regulation and Joint Costs. The Entry of Competition into Long-Distance Telecommunications 
 
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  | The FCC´s Response to the Problem | 301 | 
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Above 890. MCI. Specialized Common Carriers (SCCs). AT&T´s Competitive Response: Special Rates. Docket 18128. Expanding the Area of Competition 
 
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  | The Basic Choices | 311 | 
  | Conclusion | 314 | 
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| III. | Practical Reform | 315 | 
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| 16. | From Candidate to Reform | 317 | 
  | The Elements of Implementation | 317 | 
  | The Kennedy Hearings | 321 | 
  | Preparation. The Actual Hearings |   | 
  | Conclusion | 339 | 
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| 17. | Generic Approaches to Regulatory Reform | 341 | 
  | Better Personnel | 342 | 
  | Procedural Changes | 345 | 
  | Fairness and Efficiency. Legitimacy |   | 
  | Structural Change | 354 | 
  | Managerial Proposals. Supervisory Proposals. New Institutions |   | 
  | Encouraging Substantive Reform | 363 | 
  | Impact Statements. Encouraging Step-by-Step Reform |   | 
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| Appendix 1 The Regulatory Agencies | 371 | 
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| Appendix 2 A Note on Administrative Law | 378 | 
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| Further Reading | 382 | 
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| Notes | 386 | 
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| Index | 462 |