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Tirole, Jean The theory of industrial organization. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1997. 479 p.

Notas:
Temas:
Contenido:	Contents Preface xi Introduction 1 The Theory of the Firm 15 1. What is a Firm? 17 2. The Profit-Maximization Hypothesis 35 3. Supplementary Section: The Principal-Agent Relationship 51 Answers and Hints 55 References 56 I. The Exercise of Monopoly Power 62 Introduction 63 1. Monopoly 65 1.1. Pricing Behavior 66 1.2. Cost Distortions 75 1.3. Rent-Seeking Behavior 76 1.4. Concluding Remarks 78 1.5. Supplementary Section: Durable Goods and Limits on Monopoly Power 79 Answers and Hints 88 Appendix: A Heuristic Proof of the Coase Conjecture 91 References 92 2. Product Selection, Quality, and Advertising 95 2.1. The Notion of Product Space 96 2.2. Product Selection 100 2.3. Quality and Information 106 2.4. Advertising 115 2.5. Concluding Remarks 115 2.6. Supplementary Section: Repeat Purchases 116 Answers and Hints 126 References 129 3. Price Discrimination 133 3.1. Perfect Price Discrimination 135 3.2. Multimarket (Third-Degree) Price Discrimination 137 3.3. Personal Arbitrage and Screening (Second-Degree Price Discrimination) 142 3.4. Concluding Remarks 152 3.5. Supplementary Section: Nonlinear Pricing 153 Answers and Hints 163 References 166 4. Vertical Control 169 4.1. Linear Prices versus Vertical Restraints 170 4.2. Externalities and Vertical Control 173 4.3. Intraband Competition 181 4.4. Interbrand Competition 185 4.5. Concluding Remarks 186 4.6. Supplementary Section: Competition-Reducing Restraints 187 Answers and Hints 198 References 201 II. Strategic Interaction 204 Introduction 205 5. Short-Run Price Competition 209 5.1. The Bertrand Paradox 209 5.2. Solutions to the Bertrand Paradox: An Introduction 211 5.3. Decreasing Returns to Scale and Capacity Constraints 212 5.4. Traditional Cournot Analysis 218 5.5. Concentration Indices and Industry Profitability 221 5.6. Concluding Remarks 223 5.7. Supplementary Section: Quantity Competition 224 Answers and hints 234 References 237 6. Dynamic Price Competition and Tacit Collusion 239 6.1. Conventional Wisdom (Factors Facilitating and Hindering Collusion) 240 6.2. Static Approaches to Dynamic Price Competition 243 6.3. Supergames 245 6.4. Price Rigidities 253 6.5. Reputation for Friendly Behavior 256 6.6. Concluding Remarks 261 6.7. Supplementary Section: Dynamic Games and Tacit Collusion 262 Answers and hints 271 References 274 7. Product Differentiation: Price Competition and Non-Price Competition 277 7.1. Spatial Competition 279 7.2. Monopolistic Competition 287 7.3. Advertising and Informational Product Differentiation 289 7.4. Concluding Remarks 295 7.5. Supplementary Section: Vertical Differentiation and Monopolistic Competition 296 Answers and Hints 300 References 302 8. Entry, Accommodation, and Exit 305 8.1. Fixed Costs, Natural Monopoly and Contestability 307 8.2. Sun Costs and Barriers to Entry: The Stackelberg-Spence-Dixit Model 314 8.3. A Taxonomy of Business Strategies 323 8.4. Applications of the Taxonomy 328 8.5. Epilogue: Price versus Quantities 336 8.6. Supplementary Section: Strategic Behavior and Barriers to Entry or Mobility 338 Answers and Hints 352 References 356 9. Information and Strategic Behavior: Reputation, Limit Pricing, and Predation 361 9.1. Static Competition under Asymmetric Information 362 9.2. Dynamics: A Heuristic Approach 364 9.3. Accommodation and Tacit Collusion 365 9.4. The Milgrom-Roberts Model of Limit Pricing 367 9.5. Predation for Merger 374 9.6. Multimarket Reputation 376 9.7. The "Long Purse" Story 377 9.8. Concluding Remarks 380 9.9. Supplementary Section: Darwinian Selection in an Industry 380 Answers and Hints 384 References 386 10. Research and Development and the Adoption of New Technologies 389 10.1. Incentives as a Function of the Market Structure: The Value of Innovation 390 10.2. Introduction to Patent Races 394 10.3. Welfare Analysis of Patent Protection 399 10.4. Alternative Inducements to R&D 400 10.5. Strategic Adoption of New Technologies 401 10.6. Network Externalities, Standardization, and Compatibility 404 10.7. Concluding Remarks 409 10.8. Supplementary Section: Patent Licensing and Research Joint Ventures 410 Answers and Hints 415 References 419 11. Noncooperative Game Theory: A User´s Manual 423 11.1. Games and Strategies 423 11.2. Nash Equilibrium 425 11.3. Perfect Equilibrium 428 11.4. Bayesian Equilibrium 432 11.5. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 436 11.6. Supplementary Section 444 Answers and Hints 453 References 457 Review Exercises 460 Index 473