Centro de Documentación



Registro:Laffont, Jean-Jacques; Tirole, Jean
A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation. Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1993. 705 p.


Notas:
Temas:regulación económica, cálculo de tarifas, tarifas, teoría económica, precios Ramsey, sistemas tarifarios, teoría de la regulación, modelo de Averch-Johnson
Contenido:
Indice
página
FOREWORK
    xvii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
    xxiii
INTRODUCTION
    1
1.The Regulatory Environment and Institutions
    1
    1.1.
Regulatory Constraints
    1
    1.2.
Regulatory Instruments and Incentive Schemes
    6
    1.3.
Simper versus Informationally Demanding Regulatory Rule
    8
    1.4.
Procurement versus Regulation
    8
2.Commonly Used Incentive Schemes
    10
    2.1.
Procurement Contracts
    12
    2.2.
Regulatory Incentive Schemes in the Absense of Government Transfers
    13
3.Received Theory and the Agenda for the New Regulatory Economics
    19
    3.1.
Marginal Cost Pricing
    19
    3.2.
Peack-Load Pricing
    20
    3.3.
Marginal or Average Cost Pricing?
    23
    3.4.
Balanced Budget and the Ramsey-Boiteux Model of Cost-of-Service Regulation
    30
    3.5.
Input Choices
    33
    3.6.
The Agenda of the New Regulatory Economics
    34
4.Methodology and Overview of the Book
    35
    4.1.
The Controlled Experiment
    35
    4.2.
Overview of the Book
    39
References
    47
IPRICE AND RATE-OF-RETURN REGULATION
    1.
COST-REIMBURSEMENT RULES
    53
    1.1.
Some Background
    53
    1.2.
The Model
    55
    1.3.
The Two-Type Case
    57
    1.4.
Continuum of Types
    63
      1.4.1.
Decentralization through a Menu of Linear Cntracts
    69
      1.4.2.
Parameters of the Incentive Scheme and Performance
    71
      1.4.3.
Additive Noise and Linear Contracts
    72
      1.4.4.
The Two-Type caso and Nonlinearity of Optimal Contracts
    73
      1.4.5.
Shutdown of the Firm
    73
      1.4.6.
Compensations Caps and Cost Ceilings
    75
    1.5.
The Main Economic Conclusions
    76
    1.6.
Implementation: Relevance and Informational Requirements of Menus
    82
    1.7.
Using Yardstick "Competition" to Reduce Informational Asymmetries
    84
    1.8.
Adding Investment to the Model
    86
      1.8.1.
Contractible Investment
    88
      1.8.2.
Noncontractible investment
    91
      1.8.3.
Private Information on the Desiderability of Investment: Rate of Return on Investment, Incentives, and the Averch-Johnson Model
    93
    1.9.
Investment under Noncommitment
    99
      1.9.1.
Rent Extraction Generating Underinvestment
    100
      1.9.2.
Four Mechanisms Mitigating the Underinvestment Effect
    101
    1.10.
Multiperiod Relationship under Commitment: False Dynamics
    103
    1.11.
Risk Aversion
    105
Bibliographic Notes
    106
Appendixes
    119
References
    124
    2.
PRICING BY A SUNGLE-PRODUCT FIRM WITH AND WITHOUT BUDGET BALANCE
    129
    2.1.
Some Background
    129
    2.2.
The Model
    131
      2.2.1.
Description
    131
      2.2.2.
Full Information
    133
    2.3.
The Two-Type Case
    134
    2.4.
Continuum of Types
    137
    2.5.
Delegation of Pricing to the Firm
    139
      2.5.1.
An Introduction to Price Taxes
    139
      2.5.2.
Using Historial Data to Construct the Price Tax
    142
    2.6.
Two-Part Tariffs in the Absense of Government Transfer
    145
      2.6.1.
The Optimal Two-Part TAriff
    147
      2.6.2.
Optimal Cost-of-Service Regulation
    149
    2.7.
Linear Pricing in the Absense of Government Transfer
    151
      2.7.1.
Optimal Linear Prices as Sliding Scale Plans
    151
      2.7.2.
Relationship to Monopoly Pricing and Price Caps
    154
    2.8.
Concluding Remarks
    155
Bibliographic Notes
    155
References
    164
    3.
PRICING AND INCENTIVES IN A MULTIPRODUCT FIRM
    165
    3.1.
Some Background
    165
    3.2.
Optmal Regulation
    167
      3.2.1.
The Model
    168
      3.2.2.
The Optimal Regulatory Allocation
    169
      3.2.3.
Linearity of Cost-Reimbursement Rules
    171
    3.3.
Third-Degree Price Discrimination
    172
      3.3.1.
Ramsey Pricing
    172
      3.3.2.
Peack-Load Pricing
    173
    3.4.
Second-Degree Price Discrimination
    175
      3.4.1.
Fully Nonlinear Pricing
    175
      3.4.2.
Two-Part Tariffs
    176
    3.5.
Verifiable Quality
    177
      3.5.1.
A Procurement Example
    177
      3.5.2.
A Regulation Example
    177
    3.6.
The Incentive-Pricing Dichotomy
    178
      3.6.1.
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions
    178
      3.6.2.
Example of Nondichotomy
    180
      3.6.3.
The Incentive-Pricing Dichotomy in the Absense of Government Transfer
    180
    3.7.
Multidimensional Effort and Characteristics
    181
      3.7.1.
Effort Allocation: The Shared-Fixed-Cost Model
    181
      3.7.2.
Multidimensional Type
    184
      3.7.3.
Effort Allocation: The Shared-Marginal-Cost-Model
    186
    3.8.
Is Subcost Observation Useful?
    187
      3.8.1.
One-Dimensional Type
    189
      3.8.2.
Multidimensional Type
    191
    3.9.
General Equilibrium Analysis: Foundations of the Shadow Cost of Public Funds and Taxation by Regulation
    194
      3.9.1.
Motivation
    194
      3.9.2.
An Imperfect Income Taxation Model
    196
    3.10.
Concluding Remarks
    200
Bibliographic Notes
    202
Appendixes
    206
References
    208
    4.
REGULATION OF QUALITY
    211
    4.1.
Some Background
    211
    4.2.
The Model with a Search Good
    214
      4.2.1.
Incentives to Provide Quality
    215
    4.2.2.
Incentives for Quality and Cost Reduction
    217
    4.3.
Optimal Regulation under Asymmetric Information
    217
    4.4.
Implementation of the Optimal Regulatory Mechanism
    223
    4.5.
Concern for Quality and the Power of Incentive Schemes
    225
    4.6.
Reputation Incentives for and Experience Good
    227
    4.7.
Concluding Remarks
    231
Bibliographic Notes
    233
Appendixes
    234
References
    243
II.PRODUCT MARKET CONPETITION
    5.
COMPETITIVE RAMSEY FORMULAS AND ACCESS PRICING
    247
    5.1.
Some Background
    247
    5.2.
Pricing and Competition
    249
      5.2.1.
Regulated Competition
    250
      5.2.2.
Unregulated Competitive Fringe
    251
      5.2.3.
Unregulated Competition with Distorted Correction
    253
    5.3.
Access Pricing: Pricing in the Absense of Incentive Correction
    255
    5.4.
Access Pricing and Incentives
    258
      5.4.1.
Common Network
    259
      5.4.2.
Network Expansion
    263
    5.5.
Concluding Remarks
    266
Bibliographic Notes
    267
Appendixes
    268
References
    271
    6.
BYPASS CREMA SKIMMING
    273
    6.1.
Some Background
    273
    6.2.
The Model
    275
    6.3.
Optimal Pricing rules and optimal Incentive Schemes
    276
    6.4.
Bypass and Cream Skimming
    285
    6.5.
Some Further Considerations about Bypass: Redistribution and Bidget Constraint
    290
    6.6.
Concluding Remarks
    295
Bibliographics Notes
    296
Appendixes
    298
References
    303
III.BIDDING FOR NATURAL MONOPOLY
    7.
AUCTIONING INCENTIVE CONTRACTS
    307
    7.1.
Some Background
    307
    7.2.
The Model
    309
    7.3.
The Optimal Bayesian Auction in the Two-Firm, Two-Type Case
    310
    7.4.
The Optimal Bayesian Auction in the Continuum Case
    314
      7.4.1.
The Firm´s Bidding Behavior
    314
    7.4.2.
The Optimal Auction
    315
    7.5.
Implementation by a Dominant Strategy Auction
    319
      7.5.1.
Reduction in Transfer
    320
      7.5.2.
Equivalent Dominant Strategy Aution
    320
      7.5.3.
On the Revelation Principle in an Auction
    321
    7.6.
Optimality of Linear Contracts
    322
    7.7.
Auctions in Regulation
    322
    7.8.
Concluding Remarks
    324
Bibliographic Notes
    325
Appendixes
    337
References
    339
    8.
REPEATED AUCTIONS OF INCENTIVE CONTRACTS, INVESTMENT, AND BIDDING PARITY
    341
    8.1.
Some Bakcground
    341
    8.2.
The Model
    343
    8.3.
Optimal regulation under Asymmetric Information
    346
    8.4.
Learning by Doing
    352
    8.5.
Assessment of the Model
    355
    8.6.
Transferable Investment
    356
    8.7.
Concluding Remarks
    359
Bibliographic Notes
    360
Appendixes
    365
References
    370
IVTHE DYANMICS OF REGULATION
    9.
DYNAMICS WITHOUT COMMITMENT AND THE RATCHED EFFECT
    375
    9.1.
Some Background
    375
    9.2.
The Model
    379
    9.3.
Ratcheting and Pooling in the Continuum Case
    381
    9.4.
The Two-Tye Case
    387
      9.4.1.
Characterization of Finite First-Period Menus That induce the Upper Bound on Welfare
    388
      9.4.2.
Preliminary Analysis: Two-Contract Menus
    390
      9.4.3.
Comparative Statics of the Optimal Contract in an Example
    397
      9.4.4.
General Results
    397
    9.5.
Concluding Remarks
    401
Bibliographic Notes
    401
Appendixes
    415
References
    435
    10.
COMMITMENT AND RENEGOTIATION
    437
    10.1.
Some Background
    437
    10.2.
The Model
    440
      10.2.1.
The Commitment Framework
    440
      10.2.2.
The Renegotiation Game
    443
    10.3.
Renegotiation-Proof Second-Period Contracts
    443
    10.4.
Characterization of the Optimal Contratc
    447
    10.5.
How Mcuh Pooling
    451
    10.6.
Continuum of Types
    456
    10.7.
Commitment, Renegotiation, and Noncommitment
    458
Bibliographic Notes
    460
Appendixes
    464
References
    471
V.THE POLITICS OF REGULATION
    11.
REGULATORY CAPTURE
    475
    11.1.
Some Background
    475
    11.2.
The Model
    480
      11.2.1.
The Firm
    480
      11.2.2.
The Agency
    480
      11.2.3.
Congress
    481
      11.2.4.
Consumer Groups
    482
    11.3.
Collusion-Free Regulation
    482
      11.3.1.
Full Information
    483
      11.3.2.
Asymmetric Information
    484
    11.4.
Producer Protection
    485
    11.5.
Multiple Interest Groups
    488
    11.6.
Shutdow of the Regulated Firm
    493
    11.7.
A Political Theory of Cross-subsidization
    494
    11.8.
Concluding Remarks
    498
Bibliographic Notes
    500
Appendixes
    506
References
    512
    12
COST PADDING, AUDITING, AND COLLUSION
    515
    12.1.
Some Background
    515
    12.2.
The Benchmark (No Cost Padding, No Autiting)
    517
    12.3.
Audit of Cost Padding
    519
      12.3.1.
Benevolent Audit of Cost Padding
    519
      12.3.2.
Collusion in Auditing
    524
    12.4.
Monitoring of Effort
    527
      12.4.1.
Benevolent Monitoring of Effort
    528
      12.4.2.
Collusion in Monitoring of Effort
    529
Bibliographic Notes
    531
Appendix
    532
References
    534
        13.CARTELIZATION BY REGULATION537
          13.1.
        		Some Background537
          13.2.
        		The Model540
          13.3.
        		Benevolent Agency and Incomplete Information about the Incumbent´s Technology544
          13.4.
        		Cartelization546
          13.5.
        		Pro- and Anticompetition Agencies550
            13.5.1.
        		Summary of the Argument550
            13.5.2.
        		Agency-Entrant and Agency-Customer Collusion and Entry551
        Appendixes552
        References557
          14.
        		AUCTION DESIGN AND FAVORITISM559
          14.1.
        		Some Background559
          14.2.
        		The Model563
          14.3.
        		Optimal Auction with a Benevolent Agency565
          14.4.
        		Collusion and Soft Information568
            14.4.1.
        		Description and Collusion568
            14.4.2.
        		Soft Information569
            14.4.3.
        		Indirect Bid Rigging571
          14.5.
        		Asymmetric Collusion and Hard Information572
          14.6.
        		Symmetric Collusion and Hard Information573
          14.7.
        		Concluding Remarks578
        Appendixes581
        References587
        VI.REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS
          15.
        		REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS, HEARINGS, AND INTEREST GROUP MONITORING591
          15.1.
        		Welfare Foundations of Institutions591
          15.2.
        		The Model595
            15.2.1.
        		Components595
            15.2.2.
        		Benevolent Agency Benchmark599
            15.2.3.
        		Collusive Agency600
          15.3
        		The Sollution602
            15.3.1.
        		Average Cost Pricing602
            15.3.2.
        		Marginal Cost Pricing604
            15.3.3.
        		Optimal Institutions604
            15.3.4.
        		Subsidies for Intervener Programs608
            15.3.5.
        		Alternative Technologies609
            15.3.6.
        		Standards of Judicial Review610
          15.4.
        		Choice of Watchdog610
          15.5.
        		Concluding Remarks612
          15.5.
        		Concluding Remarks612
        Appendixes613
        References616
          16.
        		COMMITMENT AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY619
          16.1.
        		Some Background619
          16.2.
        		Short-lived Regulatoes and the Optimal Constitution621
            16.2.1.
        		The Model621
            16.2.2.
        		Commitment624
            16.2.3.
        		Noncommitment625
            16.2.4.
        		Optimal Constitution626
          16.3
        		Short-lived Regulators and COmplete Contracting627
            16.3.1.
        		Investment Induced628
            16.3.2.
        		No Investment628
          16.4.
        		Elections, Career Concerns, and Commitment630
            16.4.1.
        		Commitment Constitution631
            16.4.2.
        		Noncommitment Constitution632
            16.4.3.
        		Flexibility-on-Commitment Constitution633
            16.4.4.
        		Campaign Contributors635
          16.5.
        		Concluding Remarks635
        Bibliographic Notes636
        References636
          17.
        		PRIVATIZATION AND INCENTIVES637
          17.1.
        		Some Background637
            17.1.1.
        		Public Enterprice, Private Regulated Firm, and Unregulated Firm638
            17.1.2.
        		Conventional Wisdom about Privatizations639
            17.1.3.
        		Residual Rights Considerations642
          17.2.
        		The Model645
            17.2.1.
        		Public Ownership645
            17.2.2.
        		The Redulated Private Firm646
          17.3.
        		Optimal Regulation with Public Ownership647
          17.4.
        		optimal Regulation with a Private Firm649
            17.4.1.
        		Differentiable Equilibrium649
            17.4.2.
        		Nondifferentiable Equilibria652
          17.5.
        		Comparision of Ownership Structures653
          17.6.
        		Concluding Remarks654
        Bibliographic Notes655
        Appendixes657
        References658
        CONCLUSION661
        REVIEW EXERCISES671
        INDEX695